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Stopping Vehicles on a Downhill Slope: R. v. Nolet
Steve Coughlan*
The law need not stay the same. The Court has indicated its clear willingness to
change the law to accommodate changing social conditions, or in other circumstances. However, when the law does change, it is better for all if that happens
clearly: when it is apparent that the old approach no longer governs and it is
clear what the new approach will be. In this regard, more could have been hoped
for from Nolet} The case raises questions about the proper approach to search
issues and to detentions involving vehicle stops and seems inconsistent with previous case law in both these areas.
The Search
The Court's reasoning around why the initial search in this case does not violate
section 8 of the Charter is puzzling, or perhaps merely puzzlingly expressed.
The normal approach involves asking first whether the accused has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. If there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, then
what occurred was not a search, and so section 8 could not have been violated.
However, if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the analysis
must go further and consider whether the search was an unreasonable one. In
engaging with that question, the Collins analysis — was the search authorised
by law, is the law itself reasonable, and was the search carried out in a reasonable manner — is used.2
At times, the Court appears to be reasoning in this fashion. They conclude that
the accused did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, though it was doubly
reduced, since the cab of a truck is both a vehicle and a place of business. It was
therefore necessary to use the Collins analysis (quoted by the Court in Nolet at
para. 46) to decide whether the search was reasonable. The bulk of the Court's
reasoning — looking to the terms of the provincial search power, considering
whether the grounds for that search were satisfied or were nullified by other
factors, deciding whether the search incident to arrest power was in play, and so
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on — seem to be aimed at showing that although there was a search, it was a
reasonable one.
The puzzling point, therefore, is in the way the Court concludes that reasoning.
They conclude not that the search was reasonable, but that the actions of the
officers did not "invade" or "infringe" the accused's reasonable expectation of
privacy.-^ This sounds much more like saying that the actions of the officers
were not a search at all. It seems an odd way to conclude that the search was
reasonable because it passed the Collins analysis.
One would not feel inclined to suggest, for example, that a person who was strip
searched in accordance with the criteria set out in Golden^ did not have their
reasonable expectation of privacy infringed: we would say that that interest was
infringed but legitimately so, because of a countervailing state interest which
outweighed it. The same, really, is true of any section 8 analysis which advances
to the Collins stage. To be sure, where there is a reduced expectation of privacy
the countervailing state interest need not be as strong, but that does not change
the fundamental approach.
Presumably the Court here is not intending to change the fundamental two-step
analysis to section 8 which has been applied for many years.
The Detention
It is also not entirely easy to understand the Court's reasoning with regard to the
"predominant purpose" test and the way in which it affects the analysis of
whether the traffic stop power was properly used. The trial judge in the case had
found that the officer had used a highway traffic power primarily in order to
pursue a criminal investigation. Relying on the predominant purpose test from
Jarvis,5 he had concluded that this was a misuse of that power and therefore a
violation of the Charter. The Court here is reasonably clear that judges should
not use the predominant purpose test in this fashion, but the decision does not
provide very clear guidance as to what trial judges should do. Further, the
Court's conclusion seems to contradict what they have said previously about
vehicle stops.
It is perhaps easiest to think of a gradation of purposes in this context, since the
issue relates to regulatory and criminal purposes. At one end of the scale, an
officer might use a non-criminal stop and search power purely for regulatory
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purposes. At the other end of the scale, an officer might use that non-criminal
stop and search power purely for criminal law purposes. Neither end of the scale
creates any real difficulty: the former is obviously acceptable, and the latter
equally obviously unacceptable. Nolet does not change that and affirms that traffic stops cannot be used as a pretext. The Court concludes that "it is important
not to encourage the establishment of checkstops where a nominally lawful aim
is but a plausible facade for an unlawful aim."6
The problem area is with those cases that do not lie at either end of the scale:
that is to say, most of them. The trial judge had concluded that that the purpose
of searching for evidence of a crime had become predominant in the officer's
mind at a point when he was still purporting to rely on a regulatory search
power: on that basis, he found a misuse of the power. The trial judge felt that
once the criminal investigation purpose outweighed the regulatory investigation
purpose (at the midpoint on the scale, essentially) it would be improper to continue to use the regulatory powers. That approach is consistent with the Supreme
Court's "crossing the Rubicon" analysis in Jarvis.
In this case, however, the Court rejects this approach. First, they specifically
reject the analogy to Jarvis, holding that that case dealt with the use of powers
aimed at assessing civil liability: here, they said, there was no issue of '"crossing
the Rubicon' from a civil dispute into penal remedies."7 Both the traffic offences and the criminal offences involved penal liability, and so, apparently, the
Charter analysis does not differ between them. That is somewhat surprising.
Other courts, including courts of appeal, had taken the Jarvis reasoning to be
applicable more broadly and to apply in any case where there is a regulatory
scheme with powers of inspection and audit which might also lead to investigations for an offence. Kooktook, for example, holds that:
83 The Jarvis case concerned regulatory activities in the field of income tax.
In that field the demarcation between inspection and prosecution is much
clearer because there is an audit branch and a special investigation branch.
But there is no reason why the principles enunciated in that case would not
apply to any regulatory scheme with broad powers of inspection, such as the
Fisheries Act where the functions of inspection and investigation can both be
carried out by the same official. This was clearly contemplated, in my view,
when the Supreme Court in Jarvis, after enumerating several factors relevant
to the income tax context for the purpose of determining if an adversarial
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relationship has arisen as between the state and the individual, said (at para.
94):
It should also be noted that in this case we are dealing with the
CCRA. However, there may well be other provincial or federal
governmental departments or agencies that have different organizational settings which in turn may mean that the above factors, as well as others, will have to be applied in those particular
contexts.8

Perhaps more importantly, though, the Supreme Court in Nolet rejects adopting
an approach that is analogous to Jarvis. They conclude that regulatory powers
remain available "[a]s long as there is a continuing regulatory purpose on which
to ground the exercise of the regulatory power."9 That is, where the officer has
both purposes in mind, it apparently does not matter that the primary reason for
searching is a criminal one: as long as a regulatory purpose is still in play, the
power is available.
There is some room for argument within this test still. It might be claimed that
the point at which a traffic stop becomes a mere pretext is reached before the
scale is at "0% regulatory/100% criminal." Perhaps it becomes a pretext at 99%
criminal, or 95% criminal. Perhaps not, though, since even in these cases there
will be a "continuing regulatory purpose," however minor. Even if this wiggle
room does exist, it seems clear that the Court's approach will allow the use of
regulatory powers for predominantly criminal purposes in many cases where the
"predominant purpose" test (49% regulatory/51 % criminal) would not have.
On the one hand, this has the advantage of simplicity. It is unrealistic to think
one could decide exactly what percentage of interest should be attributed to either purpose in every case, and no doubt difficult in some cases to decide which
purpose is predominant. Not having to do so makes trial judges' jobs easier.
On the other hand, trial judges are already required to undertake the Jarvis analysis in some contexts, so it cannot be impossible to do. Further, it is not entirely
clear what trial judges ought to do now instead in this context.
The Court says:
[39] Police power, whether conferred by statute or at common law, is abused
when it is exercised in a manner that violates the Charter rights of an accused. This is a better framework of analysis, in my opinion, than the "predominant purpose" test applied here by the trial judge. If the Charter is vio-
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lated, it makes little difference, I think, that the police had in mind multiple
purposes.

This seems to state that instead of applying the predominant purpose test, courts
should ask whether there is a Charter violation. The difficulty is that that is
exactly what the predominant purpose test was: a method of determining
whether there was a Charter violation. With it gone, what would make the
search violate the Charter!
Jarvis itself was primarily a section 7 case concerning self-incrimination, rather
than section 8. If it were applied in the context of the Collins analysis, then one
might find that a search was not authorised by law because the predominant
purpose was not a proper one and so a search power was used where it was not
meant to be available. Alternatively, one might have found the search was
authorised by law and the law was reasonable, but that the manner of search was
not reasonable because of the improper predominant purpose: this is the approach implied by paragraph 39 of Nolet, quoted above. Either way, the point is
that asking about the predominant purpose and asking about whether the search
violates the Charter are not different questions. It therefore provides no guidance to say "do the latter instead of the former": the former was the way of
doing the latter.
At least implicitly the Court does seem to have adopted a new test, which is that
as long as there is any regulatory purpose in an officer's mind, no matter how
minor, the regulatory powers are available. That approach is unfortunate. The
Court refers to, and seemingly adopts, words from the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force:
While I can find no sound reason for invalidating an otherwise proper stop
because the police used the opportunity afforded by that stop to further some
other legitimate interest, I do see strong policy reasons for invalidating a stop
where the police have an additional improper purpose. Highway safety concerns are important, but they should not provide the police with a means to
pursue objects which are themselves an abuse of the police power or are
otherwise improper."

This approach seems to mean that police are allowed to use powers to pursue a
purpose which those powers were not intended to be used for, provided the purpose is not in itself objectionable: that the officer is not engaging in racial profiling, for example. That makes the fact that an officer has not used his or her
power for its intended purpose essentially irrelevant: if the purpose is improper
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in itself, it will certainly be objectionable on other Charter grounds. But if that is
the case, then limits on the use of powers to confine them to their proper
sphere — exactly the concern that motivated the Court in Jarvis — will no
longer exist.
The Court here notes its own earlier admonition from Mellenthin that a checkstop should not become "an unfounded general inquisition or an unreasonable
search."12 It would have been advisable to take account as well of the immediately preceding sentences in Mellenthin concerning vehicle stops:
The primary aim of the program is thus to check for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance and the mechanical fitness of cars. The police use of check
stops should not be extended beyond these aims.

Permitting traffic stop powers still to be used when an officer's primary purpose
is to investigate a possible criminal offence flies in the face of this approach.
It seems likely that more will need to be said on this subject in future cases.
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